/ text adunat de Răzvan Supuran
*Concept: ...Aristotle’s definition of kinesis utilises the concepts of dunamis and entelécheia: “The fulfilment [entelécheia] of what exists potentially [dunamis], in so far as it exists potentially [dunamis], is motion [kinesis]” (201a10). If (in its siple terms) kinesis is (in some sense), entelécheia, in what respect could kinesis be equated with Ross’s concept of an entelécheia wich is “that wich is always actually whatever it is”?
“The same thing, if it is of a certain kind, can be both potential [dunamis] and fully real [entelécheia], not indeed at the same time or not in the same respect, but e.g. potentially [dunamis] hot and actully [entelécheia] cold.” (Physics 201a10-22)
Ross comments: “For the most part Aristotle uses the words [entelécheia and energeia] as exact synonyms.” He explains elsewhere how this works: “Because the ergon [menaing “work or deed”, from en+ -erge- + -ia] is the telos [from en- + -tel-eche- + -ia]. ... the word energeia, wich is derived from ergon, tends to mean the same as entelécheia.
“The reason in turn why motion [kinesis] is thought to be idenfinite is that it cannot be classed simply as a potentiality [dunamis] or as an actuality [energeia] – a thing that ie merely capable [the dunamis sense], nor yet a thing that is actually [energeiai] of certain size [...], and motion [kinesis\ is thought to be a sort of actuality [energeia\ but inomplete [ateles], he reason for this view being that potential [dunamis] whose actuality [energeia] it is incomplete [ateles]. Tis is why it is hard to grasp what motion [kinesis] is. It is necessary to classify it with privation or with potentiality [dunamis] or with sheer actality [energeian], yet none of these seems possible. There remains than the suggested mose of definition, namely that it is a sort of actuality [energeia], or actuality [energeia] of the kind described [ateles?], hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing. ...Hence we can define motion [kinesis] as the fuflilment [entelécheia] of the moveable qua moveable. ...” (Physics 201b27-202a8)
Summerising the –ia discussion, it is not necessary to force aristotelian “entelechy’ out of its process element. The –ia suffix and the importance of kinesis in Aristotle’s definition of entelécheia suggest that process is a key element of Aristotelian entelechy. His three categories of kinesis-related existence may be understood as: a9 that wich is in the process of kinesis toward an end (entelécheia), b0 that wich has the potential of kinesis but wich is not now in the process (dunamis), and c) that wich is in the process of kinesis toward one end, but wich also has the potential of kinesis toward another end wich is not now in process.
**Biologie (consider necesară această precizare, care reflectă, din punct de vedere ştiinţific, înţelesurile pe care aici le dau acestor termeni):
„kinesis, like a taxis, is a movement or activity of a cell or an organism in response to a stimulus. However, unlike taxis, the response to the stimulus provided (such as gas exposure, light intensity or ambient temperature) is non-directional.”
(text apărut în MEŢERIAŞII I/07)
*Concept: ...Aristotle’s definition of kinesis utilises the concepts of dunamis and entelécheia: “The fulfilment [entelécheia] of what exists potentially [dunamis], in so far as it exists potentially [dunamis], is motion [kinesis]” (201a10). If (in its siple terms) kinesis is (in some sense), entelécheia, in what respect could kinesis be equated with Ross’s concept of an entelécheia wich is “that wich is always actually whatever it is”?
“The same thing, if it is of a certain kind, can be both potential [dunamis] and fully real [entelécheia], not indeed at the same time or not in the same respect, but e.g. potentially [dunamis] hot and actully [entelécheia] cold.” (Physics 201a10-22)
Ross comments: “For the most part Aristotle uses the words [entelécheia and energeia] as exact synonyms.” He explains elsewhere how this works: “Because the ergon [menaing “work or deed”, from en+ -erge- + -ia] is the telos [from en- + -tel-eche- + -ia]. ... the word energeia, wich is derived from ergon, tends to mean the same as entelécheia.
“The reason in turn why motion [kinesis] is thought to be idenfinite is that it cannot be classed simply as a potentiality [dunamis] or as an actuality [energeia] – a thing that ie merely capable [the dunamis sense], nor yet a thing that is actually [energeiai] of certain size [...], and motion [kinesis\ is thought to be a sort of actuality [energeia\ but inomplete [ateles], he reason for this view being that potential [dunamis] whose actuality [energeia] it is incomplete [ateles]. Tis is why it is hard to grasp what motion [kinesis] is. It is necessary to classify it with privation or with potentiality [dunamis] or with sheer actality [energeian], yet none of these seems possible. There remains than the suggested mose of definition, namely that it is a sort of actuality [energeia], or actuality [energeia] of the kind described [ateles?], hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing. ...Hence we can define motion [kinesis] as the fuflilment [entelécheia] of the moveable qua moveable. ...” (Physics 201b27-202a8)
Summerising the –ia discussion, it is not necessary to force aristotelian “entelechy’ out of its process element. The –ia suffix and the importance of kinesis in Aristotle’s definition of entelécheia suggest that process is a key element of Aristotelian entelechy. His three categories of kinesis-related existence may be understood as: a9 that wich is in the process of kinesis toward an end (entelécheia), b0 that wich has the potential of kinesis but wich is not now in the process (dunamis), and c) that wich is in the process of kinesis toward one end, but wich also has the potential of kinesis toward another end wich is not now in process.
**Biologie (consider necesară această precizare, care reflectă, din punct de vedere ştiinţific, înţelesurile pe care aici le dau acestor termeni):
„kinesis, like a taxis, is a movement or activity of a cell or an organism in response to a stimulus. However, unlike taxis, the response to the stimulus provided (such as gas exposure, light intensity or ambient temperature) is non-directional.”
(text apărut în MEŢERIAŞII I/07)
Niciun comentariu:
Trimiteți un comentariu